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Interaction eﬀectCost and expense stickiness is an important issue in accounting and economics
research, and the literature has shown that cost stickiness cannot be separated
from managers’ motivations. In this paper, we examine the eﬀects that earnings
management has on expense stickiness. Deﬁning small positive proﬁts or small
earnings increases as earnings management, we observe signiﬁcant expense
stickiness in the non-earnings-management sub-sample, compared with the
earnings-management sub-sample. When we divide expenses into R&D,
advertising and other general expenses, we ﬁnd that managers control expenses
mainly by decreasing general expenses. We further examine corporate
governance’s eﬀect on expense stickiness. Using factor analysis, we extract
eight main factors and ﬁnd that good corporate governance reduces expense
stickiness. Finally, we investigate the interaction eﬀects of earnings manage-
ment and corporate governance on expense stickiness. The empirical results
show that good corporate governance can further reduce cost stickiness,
although its eﬀect is not as strong as that of earnings management.
 2015 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by B.V. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The term expense ‘‘stickiness” captures an asymmetric expense behavior response to the direction of a
change in activities; that is, expenses increase more quickly with an increasing activity level than they decease
with a declining activity level (e.g., Noreen and Soderstrom, (1997), Cooper and Kaplan (1998), and Anderson
et al. (2003)). Because it is an important issue in both accounting and economic researches, expense stickiness,
to some degree, reﬂects the operating eﬃciency of corporate assets (Gong et al. (2010)).200433,
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expense stickiness ﬁts better with the management decision of resource adjustment in practice. The existence
of expense stickiness is strongly connected to management’s active behavior (e.g., Anderson et al. (2003) and
Banker et al. (2011)). Thus, to truly understand stickiness, it is essential to investigate the reasons why
management deliberately adjusts resources.
Most previous studies have investigated expense stickiness based on either adjustment costs or management
expectations. Some have suggested that the adjustment cost of reducing input under declining activities is
higher than that of raising input under increasing activities (e.g., Jaramillo et al. (1993), Pfann and Palm
(1993, 1997), Goux et al. (2001), and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)). This, in turn, makes it less likely to
reduce the input level (i.e., stickiness) because it is more expensive to do so. Other scholars have suggested that
managers tend to be optimistic about future revenue because most ﬁrms’ future revenues increase, making
them reluctant to reduce expenses.
When considering the wide-spread nature of agency problems in modern enterprises (Jensen and Mecking,
1976), it is unlikely that management would behave as expected in an ideal world (i.e., adjustment cost and
expectation considerations). There are conﬂicts between self-interested managers and other stakeholders, of
which earnings management behavior under compensation contracts is the most obvious. Healy (1985) found
that managers adjust earnings in order to receive higher compensation. While under pressure to avoid
breaching debt covenants, managers are also likely to choose between accounting policies (Sweeney (1994)).
Moreover, previous studies have indicated an increase in earnings management due to the incentives of
meeting or beating last year’s earnings, avoiding reporting losses, and meeting or beating consensus analysts’
forecasts (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge (1999)).
In the earnings management literature, few studies have explored earnings management’s eﬀect on expense
stickiness. Chen (2008) investigated the relationship between managerial empire building and expense sticki-
ness. Dierynck and Renders (2009) observed the stickiness of labor costs in ﬁrms that reported small positive
ROAs and slightly increased earnings. Kama and Weiss (2010) provided evidence that ﬁrms reduced the sticki-
ness of operating costs to avoid losses or earnings decreases. Compared with the cost of sales, expense is a
diﬀerent type of cost. In this paper, we shed light on the relationship between expense stickiness and earnings
management incentives.
We begin by investigating earnings management’s eﬀect on expense stickiness. We deﬁne the incentive to
avoid losses or earnings decreases as upward earnings management, and divide the sample into two parts.
Signiﬁcant expense stickiness is observed in the non-earnings-management sample, compared with the earn-
ings-management sample, indicating that managers, under pressure to report sound earnings, prefer to reduce
expenses when sales decline.
Whether expense reduction indicates increased operating eﬃciency or short-sighted and dysfunctional
managerial behavior remains an interesting question. To answer this question, we further divide expenses into
R&D, advertising, and other general expenses.1 The results show that the stickiness reduction diﬀerence
between the earnings-management and non-earnings-management sub-samples is much more signiﬁcant in
other general expenses than in R&D or advertising expenses. Facing the pressure of upward earnings manage-
ment makes managers more likely to reduce expenses in a discriminate way for their ﬁrms’ long-term
development.
Next, we analyze what inﬂuence corporate governance has over expense stickiness. Taken as an essential
part of the management operation environment, corporate governance studies have generated conﬂicting
evidence. Some attribute the chaos to the diﬃculty of setting up a reliable and eﬀective evaluation system
on corporate governance. Drawing from the work of Larcker et al. (2007), we choose the method of factor
analysis to produce a comprehensive and objective description of corporate governance. After extracting eight
main factors from the summarized corporate governance indices, we ﬁnd that good corporate governance has
a negative eﬀect on expense stickiness.
Then, we check the interaction eﬀect of earnings management and corporate governance. Our results show
that the interaction works to further reduce expense stickiness, indicating that self-interest upward earnings1 We appreciate the helpful comments of the referee.
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governance. The results imply that compared with corporate governance, earnings management incentives
have a more signiﬁcant eﬀect on reducing stickiness. We attribute this to the fact that earnings management,
as taken by managers, has a direct inﬂuence on current expenditure decisions, whereas corporate governance
works indirectly.
Finally, we subdivide the expenses and ﬁnd that the above interaction eﬀect is more signiﬁcant for reducing
the stickiness of other general expenses than R&D or advertising expenses. Moreover, the results show that the
earnings management mechanism only works in the poor corporate governance sub-sample for R&D expens-
es, whereas it works in both the good and poor corporate governance sub-samples for other general expenses.
This result proves that good corporate governance beneﬁts ﬁrms by constructing a disciplined environment
and restricting management opportunism.
This paper’s contributions are as follows. First, our study is among the ﬁrst to investigate the relation
between earnings management and expense stickiness, and thus it extends the domestic and international lit-
erature on those issues. Second, we subdivide the expenses and ﬁnd that the reductions in other general
expense stickiness have eﬃcient characteristics, which provides insights into management behavioral under
pressure. Third, compared with previous studies that have used an individual proxy to investigate the eﬀect
of corporate governance, we conduct factor analysis and extract the main factors to see the comprehensive
inﬂuence of corporate governance on expense stickiness. Fourth, instead of using a dichotomy to consider
the nature of earnings management, we ﬁnd that opportunistic earnings management has an active role in con-
trolling costs. Thus, we provide new evidence of the bright side of earnings management from the stickiness
aspect to enrich the existing research. Fifth, this paper checks the individual and interaction eﬀects of corpo-
rate governance and earnings management on expenses stickiness to provide a true understanding of the
stickiness phenomenon. Finally, our evidence helps investors better understand changes in ﬁrm expenses,
so that they can more accurately forecast ﬁrms’ future earnings or cash ﬂows.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We discuss the literature and pose our hypotheses in
Section 2 and present our research design in Section 3. We introduce our sample and data in Section 4. We
report our empirical ﬁndings in Section 5 and additional robustness tests in Section 6. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2. Related literature and hypotheses development
There are two main views about the existence of expense stickiness: rational decision-making and motiva-
tional. The rational decision-making view treats expense stickiness as a consequence of management rationally
choosing between alternatives after comprehensively weighting costs and beneﬁts. Some studies have been
guided by this view in providing detailed explanations of the following speciﬁc aspects. It has been suggested
that the adjustment cost of reducing input under declining activities is higher than that of raising input under
increasing activities (e.g., Jaramillo et al. (1993), Pfann and Palm (1993, 1997), Goux et al. (2001), Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006), Balakrishnan et al. (2004), Banker and Chen (2006), and Balakrishnan and Gruca (2008)).
Due to the above consideration, even facing declining demand, managers are less likely to reduce input
resources and related expenses, which, in turn, leads to expense stickiness. Banker et al. (2011) analyzed rele-
vant data and concluded that management commonly expect a sales increase in the following year. Thus, even
under declining activities, it is rare for management to reduce input.
The second view is motivation-based and relates expense stickiness to managerial incentives, suggesting
that managers are not expected to behave as if they were in an ideal world. Among their dysfunctional behav-
ior, perks and earnings management reﬂecting diﬀerent contracting stimulations are often observed. Chen
et al. (2008) investigated the relationship between empire building and perks, which revealed that higher
expense stickiness accompanied stronger managerial incentives for empire building. There is a large body
of literature studying diﬀerent earnings management incentives, such as compensation (Healy, 1985), debt
covenants (Sweeney, 1994), meeting or beating last year’s earnings, avoiding reporting losses, and meeting
or beating consensus analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999)).
However, studies on earnings management’s eﬀect on expense stickiness have been rare. Dierynck and
Renders (2009) found a small stickiness of labor costs in ﬁrms with small positive proﬁt or small earnings
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stickiness of operating costs.
Compared with the studies on cost stickiness, there is no literature investigating whether a similar principle
ﬁts the explanation of expense stickiness. Although production costs (both variable and ﬁxed) are unavoidable
inputs for production, the occurrence of major parts of expenses, such as those for advertising and R&D, is
likely to be decided by managers. Thus, we expect earnings management incentives to aﬀect expense stickiness.
When holding the upward earnings management incentive, managers are more likely to reduce expenses in
response to a declining demand, which in turn decreases expense stickiness.
Therefore we develop the following hypothesis:
H1. Upward earnings management signiﬁcantly decreases expense stickiness.
Because managers increase earnings in diﬀerent ways, it is necessary to investigate whether their methods
are eﬃcient. When referring to eﬃciency, we mean that managers either reduce expenses by ﬂattening the
hierarchy and improving administrative eﬃciency, or by tightly controlling expenses through perk reduction
and waste avoidance. However, choosing to cut R&D or advertising expenses for upward earnings manage-
ment is seen as an ineﬃcient way to pursue short-term goals at the expense of long-term development
(Eberhart et al. (2004)).
To further test eﬃciency, we divide expenses into R&D, advertising, and other general expenses. We deﬁne
other general expenses as those outside of R&D or advertising. Managers choosing to reduce R&D or adver-
tising expenses to increase earnings is regarded as ineﬃcient because it sacriﬁces the enterprise’s long-term
development. Managers choosing to reduce other general expenses is regarded as an eﬃcient way of control-
ling expenses.
Thus, to further investigate whether managers choose an eﬃcient way to manage earnings, we develop the
following competing hypotheses:
H2a. Under the pressure of realizing upward earnings, managers typically reduce R&D or advertising
expenses.
H2b. Under the pressure of realizing upward earnings, managers typically reduce other general expenses.
Corporate governance refers to the set of mechanisms that monitor or motivate managers when there is a
separation of ownership and control. Some of these mechanisms are the board of directors, institutional share-
holders, and market operations for corporate control (Larcker et al., 2007). These mechanisms are designed to
solve the widespread agency problem. Based on institutional economics theory, motivating and monitoring
are the main ways to solve the agency problem (Yuan, 2005). When motivating, good corporate governance
can, to some degree, support goal congruence between managers and enterprises so that the former will try to
maximize ﬁrm value. Moreover, when managers make decisions that are in the best interests of the business,
their goals are achieved more eﬃciently thanks to good corporate governance. In contrast, the monitoring role
is more important because good corporate governance reduces management opportunism while protecting
principals’ interests.
Sometimes, the self-interested behavior of managers leads to expense stickiness (Chen et al., 2008). In its
monitoring role (Wan and Wang, 2011), good corporate governance should, to some degree, reduce expense
stickiness. When managers try to improve cost control, good corporate governance is expected to facilitate the
process and reduce expense stickiness.
Calleja et al. (2006) showed that costs are stickier for French and German ﬁrms than for US and UK ﬁrms,
and they attributed this to the diﬀerences in corporate governance, as French and German ﬁrms are subject to
code-law governance systems in addition to being historically less subject to the pressure of a market for cor-
porate control. Firms in the US and the UK are arguably subject to more rigorous external scrutiny and their
corporate objective of shareholder maximization tends to produce lower levels of cost stickiness. Chen (2008)
suggested that ﬁrms with larger boards of directors or more independent boards (the separation of Chairman
and CEO, more external independent directors), and those with directors who hold larger shareholdings have
a lower level of expense stickiness. Furthermore, the above mentioned corporate governance mechanisms
work better in reducing expense stickiness when managers hold an empire building incentive. Similar
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The only diﬀerence in result was that the larger board size impeded the control of free cash ﬂow, which
increased expense stickiness.
Although Calleja et al. (2006) explained the cross-country diﬀerences in costs, they did not provide direct
evidence. Although Chen et al. (2008) raised direct evidence of the relationship between corporate governance
and expense stickiness, their measures of corporate governance were incomplete. A comprehensive system of
corporate governance is expected to comprise both internal (e.g., board independence, board working sched-
ule, structure of shareholding, etc.) and external (e.g., institutional shareholders and creditor monitoring,
regulation, auditing, etc.) mechanisms. Given a comprehensive picture of corporate governance, we develop
the following hypothesis:
H3. Good corporate governance signiﬁcantly decreases expense stickiness.
According to the ﬁrst and third hypotheses, both upward earnings management and good corporate gov-
ernance may help to reduce expense stickiness. Thus, it seems reasonable to consider their separate and inter-
active eﬀects. Warﬁeld et al. (1995) and Klein (2002) suggest that good corporate governance can restrict
earnings management. The literature usually takes earnings management as evidence of management oppor-
tunism. Here, we consider not only the disadvantages of earnings management, but also its beneﬁts. In addi-
tion to being evidence of management opportunism, upward earnings management can simultaneously
improve ﬁrms’ cost control. For example, Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008) found that ﬁrms
decreased their current year costs for upward earnings management. Thus, from a cost control perspective,
upward earnings management is value-adding for the enterprise.
As mentioned, good corporate governance can play both motivating and monitoring roles. On the one
hand, good corporate governance can restrict managers’ self-interest behavior, which may decrease sharehold-
er wealth. On the other hand, when managers are motivated to maximize ﬁrm value, good corporate gover-
nance can contribute to the success of management decisions. Here, under upward earnings management,
while managers are trying to control costs and expenses, good corporate governance is likely to be beneﬁcial.
Thus, expense stickiness is expected to decline. Thus, we develop the following hypothesis:
H4. The interaction eﬀect of good corporate governance and the motivation supplied by upward earnings
management can further reduce expense stickiness.
When raising the second hypothesis, we know that managers can reduce expense stickiness either eﬃciently
or at the expense of their ﬁrms’ long-term beneﬁts. The former (achieved by reducing other general expenses)
reﬂects management’s eﬀort to maximize shareholder wealth, whereas the latter (achieved by reducing R&D or
advertising expenses) indicates managers’ self-interest behavior. If good corporate governance does restrict
managers’ self-interest behavior, managers are expected to prefer eﬃcient methods to reduce expense sticki-
ness. If corporate governance does not help control expenses, managers are expected to prefer ineﬃcient meth-
ods. Based on whether good corporate governance restricts managers’ self-interest behavior, we develop the
following competing hypotheses:
H5a. The interaction eﬀect between good corporate governance and upward earnings management
motivation can signiﬁcantly reduce the stickiness of other general expenses, relative to R&D or advertising.
H5b. The interaction eﬀect between good corporate governance and upward earnings management motiva-
tion can signiﬁcantly reduce the stickiness of R&D or advertising expenses, relative to other general expenses.3. Research design
3.1. Measurement of expense stickiness
Consistent with the literature (Anderson et al., 2003; Subramaniam and Weidenmier, 2003), we use the fol-
lowing logarithmic model to measure expense stickiness:
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SGA = natural log of total administration and operation expenses;
REV = natural log of revenue;
DUM = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the current year REV decreases REV i;t=REV i;t1 < 1ð Þ, and 0
otherwise;
CON = control variables. Here, we mainly use CAPR and TOBQ as control variables because most of the
variables used by existing studies have already been considered in relation to corporate governance. The
details of CAPR and TOBQ are as follows:
CAPR = capital intensity, measured as the net value of ﬁxed assets scaled by operating revenue;
TOBQ = growth rate, measured as Tobin’s Q (i indicates ﬁrm and t indicates year).
Hence, we restate model (1) as follows:log
SGAi;t
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þ b4DUM  TOBQi;t  log
REV i;t
REV i;t1
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þ ei;t ð2ÞAccording to the deﬁnition of expense stickiness, a signiﬁcant negative sign of b2 in model (2) indicates the
existence of expense stickiness.
3.2. Earnings management and expense stickiness
The literature consistently indicates that earnings management allows avoiding reporting losses or earnings
decreases, meeting or beating consensus analysts’ forecasts, reducing taxation, and decreasing the probability
of debt covenant default. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) found that earnings man-
agement helps in the avoidance of reporting small losses and earnings decreases. Roychowdhury (2006) and
Cohen et al. (2008) further suggested that management reduces costs to avoid reporting losses or earnings
decreases. Based on the method used by Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008), we include two cate-
gories of data in the upward earnings management subsample. The data in the ﬁrst category report a small
positive proﬁt, which indicates incentives for avoiding reporting losses. The data in the second category report
a small increase in ROA, which indicates incentives for avoiding reporting earnings decreases.
In this study, we deﬁne those ﬁrm-year observations whose ROA is 0–1.5% as the small positive proﬁt
sub-sample, and those whose earnings change scaled by total assets is 0–1% as the small earnings increase
sub-sample. Together, they make up the sub-sample of upward earnings management. We use EAMG as an
indicator whose value equals 1 if the observation belongs to the earnings-management sub-sample and 0
otherwise.
To test H1, we regress model (2) with the earnings-management and non-earnings-management sub-
samples, separately. As H1 indicates, we expect a lower level of expense stickiness in the earnings-management
sub-sample. Thus, we expect b2 in the earnings-management sub-sample to be signiﬁcantly higher than in the
non-earnings-management sub-sample. The sign of b2 in the non-earnings-management sub-sample should be
signiﬁcantly negative due to the existence of expense stickiness.
3.3. Eﬃciency of reducing expense stickiness
To investigate whether the reduction of expense stickiness reﬂects eﬃcient behavior, we further divide
expenses (SGA) into R&D, advertising (ADV), and other general expenses (GSGA). H2a indicates that
managers reduce expense stickiness at the expense of ﬁrms’ long-term beneﬁts, whereas H2b indicates that
managers use an eﬃcient way to reduce expenses.
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holds, because managers choose to mainly reduce R&D or advertising expense to increase earnings, b2 in the
earnings-management sub-sample should be signiﬁcantly higher than in the non-earnings-management sub-
sample, and the sign of b2 in the non-earnings-management sub-sample should be signiﬁcantly negative when
using R&D and ADV instead of SGA. The inter-sample diﬀerence of b2 is not expected to be signiﬁcant when
using GSGA instead of SGA. However, if H2b holds, the above expected results should be opposite.
3.4. Corporate governance and expense stickiness
Most of the previous studies have measured corporate governance with single or aggregative indices, which
are obviously arbitrary. Furthermore, the empirical results of those studies are conﬂicting. Larcker et al.
(2007) suspected that part of the explanation for these mixed results is that the measures used in the empirical
analyses exhibit a modest level of reliability and construct validity. For example, when using a single indicator
(e.g., percentage of independent directors) to represent a complex construct (e.g., board independence),
measurement error is likely to result in inconsistent regression coeﬃcients. Similar problems arise if a set of
indicators are naively summed to form some type of governance index (e.g., the ‘‘G-score” used by
Gompers et al. (2003)). The use of multiple indicators can alleviate the measurement error associated with
a single indicator. However, unless the individual indicators are measuring the same underlying governance
construct, the resulting index is diﬃcult to interpret and likely to contain substantial measurement error.
Larcker et al. (2007) suggested that factor analysis be applied to extract main factors from the multiple
indicators of corporate governance. The beneﬁts of using factor analysis are worth noting. First, it avoids
the measurement error introduced by a single index. Second, it reduces the arbitrary nature of using an
aggregative index formed by a set of naive indicators. Third, it eliminates the inﬂuence of collinearity and
improves the accuracy of parameter estimation and hypothesis testing. Finally, compared with using principal
component analysis (PCA), factor analysis can raise a much more clear result thanks to the process of factor
rotation, which can eﬀectively identify the interaction eﬀect of the same index on diﬀerent principal
components.
Given the advantages of using factor analysis, we develop our method based on the work of Larcker et al.
(2007). We use PCA to identify the main dimensions of corporate governance and the relations between its
factors. Eight factors with characteristic values greater than 1 are retained. We run orthogonal and oblique
rotation in sequence and get the corresponding factor scores. We use the orthogonal rotation process to
get consistent ﬁnal results and the oblique rotation process to increase the explanation power.
We develop the following model:log
SGAi;t
SGAi;t1
 
¼ b0 þ b1 log
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X10
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þ b12DUM  TOBQit
 log REV i;t
REV i;t1
 
þ ei;t ð3ÞFACT i(i ¼ 3; . . . ; 10) represents the eight factors of corporate governance and the other variables are deﬁned as
in model (2). We ﬁrst test the individual eﬀect of each factor by sequentially integrating them into model (3).
The sign of b2 is expected to be signiﬁcantly negative due to expense stickiness. If H3 holds, the sign of bi
(i ¼ 3;    ; 10) is expected to be signiﬁcantly positive because good corporate governance can decrease expense
stickiness. Likewise, we expect to ﬁnd a similar result when integrating all of the factors into model (3).
3.5. Management incentives and corporate governance
To test H4, we run model (2) on four sub-samples. We ﬁrst raise the following equation to get each
ﬁrm-year’s corporate governance score:
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FACT i  EIGNi ð4Þwhere
CGSC = the corporate governance score;
FACT i = the score of each corporate governance factor; and
EIGNi = each factor’s characteristic value produced by conversion with the symbol of economic
signiﬁcance.
A higher amount of CGSC indicates better corporate governance of the observation. However, we rank the
CGSC from lowest to highest. CGID equals 1 when CGSC is greater than the median (which represents good
corporate governance) and 0 otherwise. We further divide the sample into two sub-samples ðCGID ¼ 1 and 0Þ,
giving four sub-samples when using both EAMG and CGID as classiﬁcation standards. Represented by the
form of (EAMG=CGID), these four sub-samples are (0/0), (0/1), (1/0), and (1/1).
If H4 holds, because the interaction eﬀect between good corporate governance and upward earnings
management motivation can further reduce expense stickiness, we expect b2 in the (1/1) sub-sample to be
signiﬁcantly higher than in the other three sub-samples.
We replace SGA with R&D, ADV, and GSGA and use the same model (2) to test H5. If H5a holds, when
using R&D or ADV instead of GSGA, upward earnings management is expected to signiﬁcantly reduce
expense stickiness only in the CGID ¼ 0 subsample. However, if H5b holds, the stickiness of R&D or ADV
is expected to decrease with upward earnings management in both the CGID ¼ 0 and CGID ¼ 1 subsamples.
4. Sample and data
4.1. Data source and sample selection
We begin with all Chinese non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms listed in the A-share market between 2003 and 2010. This
period is selected mainly due to the availability of some corporate governance indices. We then remove obser-
vations that have M&A or change the main industry, that have missing or negative values of the current or
prior year’s revenue and expenses, whose current year’s expenses are larger than revenue, and those with miss-
ing corporate governance indices or control variables. This leaves us with a ﬁnal sample size of 7702 ﬁrm-year
observations. Table 1 indicates this sample selection process. The ﬁnancial data and corporate governance
indicators are obtained from the CSMAR and RESSET databases. Data on the ultimate controlling share-
holder is collected from the CCER database and we double-check it using the WIND database. We manually
collect R&D and ADV from the annual reports of listed ﬁrms. These data are usually reported in the note
‘‘Other cash paid related to operating activities.” R&D includes items such as research, development, and
consulting costs. ADV consists of expenses related to advertising and marketing activities.
Panel A of Table 2 lists the distribution of the sample observations by year, which shows no great change in
observation numbers in diﬀerent years. Panel B provides a distribution picture of the diﬀerent earnings
management incentives sub-samples. Speciﬁcally, 1462 ﬁrm-years, or 18.92% of total observations indicate
an incentive to avoid reporting small losses, while a similar amount of 1582 (20.54%) observations indicate an
incentive to avoid reporting small earnings decreases. Because there are ﬁrm years with both of the above
mentioned incentives, the total amount of observations with upward earnings management incentives are
2670—more than a third of the whole sample.
4.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the main variables used in testing the hypotheses. We do not
include the description of corporate governance variables in Table 3 because they are shown in the subsequent
factor analysis process.
Table 1
Sample selection process.
Sample selection procedure Number Remaining
observations
Observations of Chinese non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms listed in the A-share market between 2003 and 2010 13,114 13,114
Minus:
Observations that have M&A or change the main industry (1378) 11,736
Observations with missing or negative values for the current or last year’s revenue and expenses (96) 11,640
Observations whose current year’s expense is larger than revenue (386) 11,254
Observations with missing corporate governance indices or control variables (3552) 7702
Final ﬁrm-year observations 7702
Table 2
Sample distribution.
Panel A sample distribution by year
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 合计
Number 988 1,037 760 768 930 1,140 1,165 914 7,702
Percent 12.83% 13.46% 9.87% 9.97% 12.07% 14.80% 15.13% 11.87% 100%
Sample types Number Percent (%)
Panel B sample distribution by earnings management
Observations with the purpose of avoiding reporting small losses 1462 18.98
Observations with the purpose of avoiding reporting earnings decreases 1582 20.54
Earnings-management observations 2670 34.67
Non-earnings-management observations 5032 65.33
Total observations 7702 100.00
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Mean Median Min. Max. Std. dev
REV 5735.95 1160.35 7.57 1,913,182.00 46,603.48
SGA 491.59 128.36 2.30 121,072.00 3241.65
SGA/REV (%) 8.57 11.06 6.33 30.31 6.96
log[REVt/REVt1] 0.159 0.151 5.270 3.804 0.375
log[SGAt/SGAt1] 0.148 0.138 2.820 2.682 0.368
DUM* log[REVt/REVt1] 0.057 0.000 5.270 0.000 0.192
CAPR 0.694 0.437 0.000 20.342 0.941
TOBQ 1.735 1.324 0.000 23.239 1.257
R&D/REV (%) 0.75 0.02 0.00 6.76 1.39
ADV/REV (%) 0.64 0.02 0.00 5.45 1.47
GSGA/REV (%) 7.17 10.51 5.95 30.27 6.85
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are right-skewed and it is reasonable to take the natural log of the initial amount in the subsequent regression.
The standard deviations of REV and SGA are 46,603 and 3242, respectively, signiﬁcantly larger than their
means, which indicates that there is large variation in these variables. We report a mean (median)
SGA=REV of 8.57% (11.06%), which is smaller than the value of 26.41% (17.79%) reported in the work of
Anderson et al. (2003). Here, we suggest that this may be due to the diﬀerence between Chinese
Accounting Standards and U.S. GAAP.
On average, ﬁrm revenues and expenses increase during the sample period due to the positive values of log
[REVt/REVt1] and log[SGAt/SGAt1]. The mean (median) of log[REVt/REVt1] and log[SGAt/SGAt1] are
0.159 (0.151) and 0.148 (0.138), respectively. However, log[REVt/REVt1] has a minimum of 5.27 (indicating
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large growth in revenue), and a standard deviation of 0.375 (indicating that the annual changes in ﬁrm
revenues are quite diﬀerent). The same characteristics are found in log[SGAt/SGAt1] (with a minimum of
2.82, a maximum of 2.682, and a standard deviation of 0.368). The mean (median) of DUM * log[REVt/
REVt1] is 0.057 (0) and it is therefore left-skewed. It has a minimum of 5.27, a maximum of 0, and a
standard deviation of 0.196, indicating that the annual variances in revenues for decreasing ﬁrms are also quite
large.
The mean (median) values of CAPR and TOBQ are 0.694 (0.437) and 1.735 (1.324), and their standard
deviations are 0.941 and 1.257, respectively, which indicates signiﬁcant cross-sample variance.
After further dividing SGA into R&D, ADV, and GSGA, we ﬁnd that the mean (median) values of (R&D/
REV) and (ADV/REV) are 0.75% (0.02%) and 0.64% (0.02%), respectively. Given that (GSGA/REV) has a
mean (median) value of 7.17% (10.51%), on average, other general expenses comprise the majority of total
expenses.
5. Main empirical results
5.1. The existence of expense stickiness
The results of the OLS regression based on model (2) are shown in Table 4. Compared with the results in
Column (1), Column (2) adds control variables. Based on results in Column (1), b1 is 0.518 and signiﬁcantly
positive at the 1% level. The value of b1 is consistent with our expectation that expenses increase with growing
revenue but at a lower speed. b2 is 0.275 and signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level, which indicates the
existence of expense stickiness, as expected. When putting additional control variables into the estimation,
we ﬁnd similar results. Here, b2 is 0.363, which is lower than that in Column (1) and suggests a larger level
of expense stickiness. b3 is positive but not statistically signiﬁcant and b4 is signiﬁcantly positive, indicating a
lower level of expense stickiness in fast-growing ﬁrms. In summary, the results reported in Table 4 indicate
expense stickiness in Chinese ﬁrms listed in A-share markets, which is consistent with previous research
ﬁndings (e.g., Kong et al. (2007) and Gong et al. (2010)).
5.2. Earnings management and expense stickiness (H1)
The regression results of upward earnings management on expense stickiness are reported in Table 5.
Compared with the results in Columns (1) and (2), Columns (3) and (4) add CAPR and TOBQ.Table 4
Regression results based on model (2) for the whole sample.
Expected sign Coeﬃcients (t-statistics)
(1) (2)
b0 0.050 0.048
(9.77)*** (9.48)***
b1 + 0.518 0.521
(37.77)*** (37.88)***
b2 – 0.275 0.363
(10.24)*** (10.15)***
b3 ? 0.008
(1.18)
b4 ? 0.033
(3.83)***
Adj-R2 0.196 0.197
F 853.11 474.29
N 7702 7702
The superscripts ** and * indicate two-tailed statistical signiﬁcance at the 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
*** indicates two-tailed statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
The bold variable(s) is the tested variable(s) we focus on.
S. Xue, Y. Hong /China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 41–58 51As Table 5 shows, b2 in Column (1) is positive and not statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that upward earn-
ings management decreases expense stickiness. The value of b2 is lower in Column (2) than that reported in
Table 4 (results of the whole sample), which suggests that expense stickiness is mainly explained by the obser-
vations in the non-earnings-management sub-sample. Similar results are found after estimating with addition-
al control variables and the value of b2 in Column (4), 0.447, is lower than that in Column (2), 0.337,
revealing a higher level of expense stickiness after controlling for other variables.
To summarize, the results in Table 5 provide evidence that expense stickiness is mainly found in the non-
earnings-management sub-sample. Moreover, the value of b2 in the earnings-management sub-sample is larger
than that in the non-earnings-management sub-sample and the diﬀerence (not tabulated) is statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 1% level (v2 test = 22.37). Thus, consistent with H1, the evidence suggests that upward earnings
management signiﬁcantly decreases expense stickiness.
5.3. Eﬃciency of expense stickiness reduction (H2)
What expense types do managers tend to reduce under earnings pressure? The results are reported in
Table 6. The results of R&D are shown in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. The values of b2 in both columns
are negative and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating the existence of expense stickiness in both samples. In the
earnings-management sub-sample, R&D decreases 0.155% (0.330–0.175%) with every 1% of revenue, and
0.078% (0.38–0.302%) in the non-earnings-management sub-sample. The results suggest that R&D in both
sub-samples is sticky. Although the amount of R&D reduction is greater in the earnings-management sub-
sample than in the non-earnings-management sub-sample, the diﬀerence between these two sub-samples is
not statistically signiﬁcant (v2 test = 1.57). The results in Columns (3) and (4) provide evidence that there is
little stickiness of ADV in either sub-sample. The results of GSGA are represented in Columns (5) and (6).
The value of b2 in Column (6) is 0.505 and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level and that in Column (5)
is 0.11 and not statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that upward earnings management signiﬁcantly reduces
the stickiness of GSGA.
The results in Table 6 imply that when facing the pressure of upward earnings management, managers may
reduce R&D (which may be seen as a way to pursue a short-term target at the expense of long-term beneﬁts),
but it is more likely that managers choose to decrease other general expenses that lead to a lower level of
expense stickiness. Thus, the evidence suggests that the ways in which managers reduce expense stickiness
are eﬃcient when they hold an upward earnings management incentive.Table 5
Regression results of earnings management incentive on expense stickiness.
Coeﬃcient (t-statistics)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EAMG = 1 EAMG = 0 EAMG = 1 EAMG = 0
b0 0.034 0.068 0.034 0.067
(4.15)*** (10.35)*** (4.15)*** (10.2)***
b1 0.431 0.522 0.430 0.523
(14.97)*** (32.66)*** (14.89)*** (32.75)***
b2 0.014 0.337 0.080 0.447
(0.26) (10.52)*** (1.16) (10.16)***
b3 0.001 0.009
(0.13) (0.76)
b4 0.038 0.053
(1.78) (5.45)***
Adj-R2 0.163 0.205 0.163 0.209
F 260.09 647.79 130.90 333.18
N 2670 5032 2670 5032
The superscripts ** and * indicate two-tailed statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
*** indicates two-tailed statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
The bold variable(s) is the tested variable(s) we focus on.
Table 6
Eﬃciency of reducing expense stickiness.
Independent variable Independent variable Independent variable
R&D ADV GSGA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EAMG = 1 EAMG = 0 EAMG = 1 EAMG = 0 EAMG = 1 EAMG = 0
b0 0.021 0.042 0.041 0.055 0.027 0.071
(2.05)** (2.96)*** (3.55)*** (3.17)*** (4.66)*** (12.68)***
b1 0.330 0.380 0.460 0.575 0.464 0.551
(9.85)*** (25.33)*** (17.74)*** (39.87)*** (18.21)*** (36.62)***
b2 0.175 0.302 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.505
(2.27)** (5.79)*** (0.65) (1.18) (1.39) (12.01)***
b3 0.221 0.259 0.005 0.024 0.007 0.014
(5.42)*** (5.86)*** (0.13) (0.76) (0.13) (0.76)
b4 0.032 0.041 0.004 0.002 0.050 0.059
(1.51) (4.05)*** (0.02) (0.01) (2.36)** (6.78)***
Adj-R2 0.336 0.361 0.352 0.389 0.150 0.184
F 180.8 496.2 169.4 446.5 118.5 285.4
N 2670 5032 2670 5032 2670 5032
v2 test 1.57 1.86 11.82***
The superscript and * indicates two-tailed statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** indicates two-tailed statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** indicates two-tailed statistical signiﬁcance at 1% level.
The bold variable(s) is the tested variable(s) we focus on.
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The detailed descriptions of the corporate governance variables are listed in the Appendix. Because the
results in the literature (e.g., Larcker et al. (2007), Jin and Yuan (2007), Gao et al. (2006), and Bai et al.
(2005)) can be conveniently reached and Armstrong et al. (2010) provided a comprehensive overview of the
studies on this issue, to be parsimonious we only present the variables without detailing the reasoning behind
their selection.
Table 7 reports the results of our corporate governance factor analysis. We extract eight factors with char-
acteristic values greater than one, and which explain about 60% of the raw data variance, similar to the results
of Larcker et al. (2007), who obtained 61.7% explanatory power. The ﬁrst factor (FACT1) represents ownership
concentration, including ‘‘shareholding of largest shareholders,” ‘‘shareholding of second to tenth sharehold-
ers,” and ‘‘Z index.” The score of FACT1 increases with growing ownership concentration. The ‘‘numbers of
board meetings, supervisors’ meetings and shareholders’ meetings”make up the second factor (FACT2), which
reﬂects the number of meetings, with a higher score indicating a larger number of meetings. FACT3, which
reﬂects external governance, is made up of ‘‘listed in B or H-share market,” ‘‘audited by the Big 4,” and ‘‘audit
fee,” which are interrelated because ﬁrms listed in markets other than A-share markets have more demand for
the assurance service supplied by reputable auditors and correspondingly are charged higher audit fees.
FACT4, which reﬂects the nature of ﬁrms, includes two indicators—‘‘central” and ‘‘local” SOE—with private
ﬁrms receiving higher scores. FACT5, which reﬂects ‘‘shareholding of institutional investors” and ‘‘sharehold-
ing of funds,” represents institutional investors and its score increases with institutional investors’ shareholding.
FACT6, including ‘‘percent of independent directors” and ‘‘board size,” is assigned a higher score with a larger
percent of independent directors or a smaller board size. Given a ﬁxed number of independent directors, a
smaller board size indicates a larger percent of independent directors. ‘‘Separation of chairman and CEO”
and ‘‘management shareholding” constitute the seventh factor (FACT7), with a higher score assigned to ﬁrms
that separate chairman and CEO, or have more management shareholdings (the higher the level of manage-
ment’s shareholding, the more goal-congruence between management and shareholders). FACT8 reﬂects the
‘‘same place,” with a higher score if independent directors work at the same place where the ﬁrm is located.
The regression results of corporate governance on expense stickiness are shown in Table 8. We present the
results of integrating each factor into estimating model (3), one at a time, from Columns (1) to (8). The esti-
mation result including all of the factors is shown in Column (9). The value of b2 in all of the columns is
Table 7
Corporate governance factors.
Factor Coeﬃcient of
load
Factor Coeﬃcient of
load
Ownership concentration (FACT1) Institutional investors (FACT5)
Shareholding of the largest shareholder 0.846 Shareholding of institutional investors 0.825
Shareholding of the second to the tenth
largest shareholders
0.732 Shareholding of funds 0.713
Z index 0.780
Number of meetings (FACT2) Percent of independent directors and board size
(FACT6)
0.821
No. of board meetings 0.791 Percent of independent directors 0.713
No. of supervisors’ meetings 0.714 Board size
No. of shareholders’ meetings 0.759 0.702
Separation of chairman and CEO, management
shareholding (FACT7)
External governance (FACT3) Separation of chairman and CEO 0.705
Listed in B or H-share market 0.797 Management shareholding
Audited by the Big 4 0.767
Audit fee 0.680 Same place (FACT8)
Independent director works in the same place where
the ﬁrm is located
0.965
Nature of ﬁrms (FACT4)
Central SOE 0.857
Local SOE 0.835
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stickiness. In Column (1), b3 is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that the concentration of share-
holding can decrease expense stickiness. A high ownership concentration may represent the concentration of
management authority, which in turn promotes the success of managers’ cost control processes. From Column
(2), we ﬁnd that more meetings beneﬁt the reduction in expense stickiness, as b4 is signiﬁcantly positive. This
result may be because a higher number of meetings indicates a more transparent governance environment and
convenient communication between diﬀerent ﬁrm levels, prompting the widespread pursuit of cost control
targets by ﬁrms. b5 in Column (5) is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that ﬁrms that list in B
or H-share markets and are audited by reputable auditors have a lower level of expense stickiness, indicating
that good external governance can help managers to better control costs. The value of b6 is signiﬁcantly posi-
tive in Column (4), suggesting that ﬁrms other than central SOEs have a lower level of expense stickiness. We
provide evidence of the ways in which institutional shareholders beneﬁt from the cost control aspect because
b7 in Column (5) is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that an increase in institutional investors’
shareholding can help reduce expense stickiness. b8 in Column (6) is positive but not statistically signiﬁcant.
Although the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant, it still indicates that an increase in the percentage of inde-
pendent directors may, to some degree, reduce expense stickiness. The signiﬁcantly positive sign of b9 in
Column (7) shows that separating the chairman and CEO or increasing management shareholdings can help
reduce expense stickiness. When independent directors work in the same place where a ﬁrm is located, it has a
limited eﬀect on reducing expense stickiness because b9 is positive but not statistically signiﬁcant in Column
(8). When all of the factors are considered, we ﬁnd similar results in Column (9), with a little weaker statistical
signiﬁcance of some coeﬃcients. To summarize, the results reported in Table 8 provide evidence that good
corporate governance (especially high ownership concentration, hardworking boards, good external
governance, separation of chairman and CEO, and management shareholdings) can signiﬁcantly decrease
expense stickiness, which is consistent with H3.5.5. Interaction eﬀect between earnings management and corporate governance (H4)
The regression results, based on sub-samples divided by earnings management and corporate governance,
are listed in Table 9. As noted, EAMG ¼ 0 (1) indicates the sub-sample without (with) earnings management
Table 8
Corporate governance and expense stickiness.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
b0 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.048 0.051 0.048 0.051
(9.56)*** (9.57)*** (9.58)*** (9.59)*** (9.55)*** (9.46)*** (9.88)*** (9.44)*** (9.96)***
b1 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.521 0.517 0.521 0.516
(37.89)*** (37.85)*** (37.82)*** (37.79)*** (37.84)*** (37.89)*** (37.64)*** (37.9)*** (37.61)***
b2 0.368 0.361 0.354 0.348 0.329 0.363 0.355 0.370 0.337
(10.3)*** (10.1)*** (9.84)*** (9.56)*** (8.62)*** (10.1)*** (9.94)*** (10.3)*** (8.63)***
b3 Interaction
with FACT1
0.106 0.082
(4.81)*** (3.61)***
b4 Interaction
with FACT2
0.067 0.035
(3.48)*** (1.67)*
b5 Interaction
with FACT3
0.082 0.062
(2.81)*** (2.12)**
b6 Interaction
with FACT4
0.050 0.024
(2.24)** (1.06)
b7 Interaction
with FACT5
0.068 0.031
(2.53)*** (1.09)
b8 Interaction
with FACT6
0.017 0.011
(0.96) (0.63)
b9 Interaction
with FACT7
0.121 0.084
(5.39)*** (3.47)***
b10 Interaction
with FACT8
0.029 0.031
(1.49) (1.54)
b11 Interaction
with CAPR
0.012 0.016 0.011 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.021
(1.83)* (2.24)** (1.59) (1.04) (2.53)*** (0.98) (1.64) (1.52) (2.78)***
b12 Interaction
with TOBQ
0.040 0.029 0.034 0.030 0.029 0.031 0.036 0.033 0.035
(4.58)*** (3.37)*** (3.96)*** (3.46)*** (3.35)*** (3.54)*** (4.25)*** (3.84)*** (3.85)***
F 385.15*** 382.41*** 381.36*** 380.64*** 380.98*** 379.62*** 386.63*** 379.94*** 164.04***
Adj_R2 0.1996 0.1985 0.198 0.1977 0.1979 0.1973 0.2002 0.1975 0.2026
N 7702 7702 7702 7702 7702 7702 7702 7702 7702
* indicates two-tailed statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** indicates two-tailed statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** indicates two-tailed statistical signiﬁcance at 1% level.
The bold variable(s) is the tested variable(s) we focus on.
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corresponding coeﬃcient diﬀerences for each column (row) and their t values (based on the Chow test using
dummy variables) are listed in the last row (column). The coeﬃcient diﬀerences between groups (1/1) and (0/0)
and their t values are listed in the lower-right corner.
As Table 9 shows, the value of b2 is 0.173 and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level in the (1/1) sub-
sample, indicating anti-stickiness (e.g., Balakrishnan et al. (2004) and Weiss (2010)).2 Therefore, the stickiness
of expenses in the (1/1) sub-sample is at a lower level than in the other sub-samples. The diﬀerence in b22 The concept of anti-stickiness was ﬁrst raised by Balakrishnan et al. (2004). Costs are deemed anti-sticky if they increase less when
activity rises than they decrease when activity falls by an equivalent amount. For more information, refer to Section II of Balakrishnan
et al. (2004) and the graph description or explanation of Weiss (2010).
Table 9
Interaction eﬀect of EM and CG on expense stickiness.
Value of b2 CGID = 0 CGID = 1 Dif.
EAMG = 0 0.475 0.317 0.159
(7.38)*** (4.73)*** [1.68]*
N = 2476 N = 2556
EAMG = 1 0.019 0.173 0.154
(0.17) (1.88)* [1.05]
N = 1375 N = 1295
Dif. 0.494 0.490 0.649
[3.41]*** [4.12]*** [5.05]***
The t value of estimating b2 is included in (), and that of the Chow test is included in [].
The superscript ** indicates two-tailed statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
* indicates two-tailed statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
*** indicates two-tailed statistical signiﬁcance 1% level.
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and (0/1), which is 0.49 and also signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Although the diﬀerence between (1/1) and (1/0) is
not statistically signiﬁcant, it is still positive and consistent with our expectations. Thus, the above results sup-
port H4, which suggests that the interaction eﬀect of upward earnings management and good corporate gov-
ernance can further reduce expense stickiness.
From Table 9, we further ﬁnd that upward earnings management increases the value of b2 to 0.494 (0.490)
in the bad (good) corporate governance sub-sample, which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, indicating
that upward earnings management has a great eﬀect on reducing expense stickiness. Although the increased
diﬀerence in b2 by good corporate governance is 0.159 (0.154) in the non-earnings-management (earnings-
management) sub-sample, only the amount in the non-earnings-management sub-sample is statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 10% level. Compared with corporate governance, upward earnings management has a greater
inﬂuence on reducing the level of expense stickiness because the diﬀerences due to earnings management are
not only larger, but also more signiﬁcant than those due to corporate governance. Earnings management, as
taken by managers, has a direct inﬂuence on current expenditure decisions, whereas corporate governance
works indirectly.5.6. Eﬀects of corporate governance and earnings management on diﬀerent expenses (H5)
Table 10 reports the results of testing H5. We do not list the regression results on ADV in Table 10 as they
are not statistically signiﬁcant. The eﬀect of earnings management on reducing R&D stickiness is onlyTable 10
Regression results of diﬀerent expenses.
Value of b2 R&D GSGA
CGID = 0 CGID = 1 Dif. CGID = 0 CGID = 1 Dif.
EAMG = 0 0.353 0.284 0.069 0.586 0.392 0.174
(6.84)*** (5.01)*** [0.05] (9.95)*** (5.56)*** [1.77]*
N = 2476 N = 2556 N = 2476 N = 2556
EAMG = 1 0.105 0.224 0.019 0.005 0.175 0.170
(1.64) (2.86)** [0.01] (0.04) (1.92)* [1.28]
N = 1375 N = 1295 N = 1375 N = 1295
Dif. 0.248 0.060 0.129 0.591 0.567 0.761
[4.04]*** [0.04] [2.35]** [4.35]*** [4.66]*** [6.01]***
The t value of estimating b2 is included in () and that of the Chow test is included in [].
* indicates two-tailed statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** indicates two-tailed statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** indicates two-tailed statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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restrict managers’ discretional behavior of pursuing short-term targets at the expense of long-term beneﬁts.
In both good and bad corporate governance sub-samples, upward earnings management can signiﬁcantly
decrease the stickiness of GSGA. Thus, the results in Table 10 suggest that managers mainly choose to reduce
other general expenses to meet earnings targets, which is consistent with H5a.
6. Robustness tests
To examine the consistency of our results, we run the following robustness tests. As Subramaniam and
Weidenmier (2003) and Kong et al. (2007) suggest, there are diﬀerent driving factors on stickiness in dif-
ferent industries. Thus, we add dummy variables to our regressions to control for industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
Due to the changing economic environment, the driving factors for expense stickiness may change over
time. To control for time eﬀects, we add year dummy variables to our regression. We run the regressions
based on diﬀerent earnings-management deﬁnitions, including ﬁrm-years whose ROA are 0–1%, 0–1.8%,
and 0–2% as the observations with the purpose of avoiding reporting small losses, and ﬁrm-years whose
changes in earnings scaled by total asset are 0–0.5%, 0–0.8%, 0–1.3%, and 0–1.5% as observations with the
purpose of avoiding reporting earnings decreases. In addition to regressing based on the whole earnings-
management sub-sample, we regress based on the sub-samples of avoiding reporting small losses and earn-
ings decreases separately. Diﬀerent methods are used to extract corporate governance factors, including
PCA, iterative PCA, and factor analysis based on non-weighted least squares. To summarize, the results
are similar to those shown in the main empirical section and thus our conclusions are robust to the above
mentioned tests.
7. Conclusion
Cost and expense stickiness is an important issue in accounting and economics research. The literature
has shown that cost stickiness cannot be separated from managers’ motivations. Based on the literature,
we ﬁrst study the inﬂuence of earnings management on expense stickiness. Deﬁning small positive proﬁts
or small earnings increases as earnings management, we ﬁnd that there is signiﬁcantly more expense sticki-
ness in our non-earnings-management sub-sample than in our earnings-management sub-sample, which
indicates that managers prefer to reduce more expenses under the pressure of reporting sound earnings.
To check whether the expense reduction indicates better operating eﬃciency or managers’ dysfunctional
short-sighted behavior, we further divide expenses into R&D, advertising, and other general expenses.
The results show that the diﬀerence in the reduction in stickiness between the earnings-management
and non-earnings-management sub-samples is much more signiﬁcant in other general expenses than in
R&D or advertising expenses. We also analyze the inﬂuence of corporate governance on the stickiness
of expenses. Based on Larcker et al. (2007), we extract eight main factors from the summarized corporate
governance indices and ﬁnd that good corporate governance has a negative eﬀect on expense stickiness.
We ﬁnally check the interaction eﬀect between earnings management and corporate governance and ﬁnd
that the interaction further reduces expense stickiness. Our results imply that earnings management incen-
tives have a more signiﬁcant eﬀect on reducing the stickiness than corporate governance, and that ﬁrms
beneﬁt from good corporate governance, as it restricts management opportunism, especially under earn-
ings pressure.
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S. Xue, Y. Hong /China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 41–58 57Appendix A. Selection of corporate governance variablesVariables DeﬁnitionsBoard variablesSeparation of chairman and CEO 1 if the same person is chairman and CEO, 0 for separation, and
0.5 for uncertaintyBoard size The number of directors (including the chairman)
Percent of independent directors The independent directors’ percentage of the whole board
Independent director works in the same
place where the ﬁrm is located0 for diﬀerent, 1 for the same, and 0.5 for uncertainty. When
there is more than one independent director, the standard is
based on the independent director’s ﬁnancial background. If
more than one independent director with a ﬁnancial background
is hired, the variable is 0 as long as one of them works in a
diﬀerent placeNo of committees The number of strategy, nomination, compensation, and audit
committees set by the boardNo. of board meetings The number of board meetings in the ﬁnancial year
No. of supervisors’ meetings The number of supervisors’ meetings in the ﬁnancial year
No. of shareholders’ meetings The number of shareholders’ meetings in the ﬁnancial yearShareholding structure variables
Shareholding of largest shareholder The largest shareholders’ shareholding percentage of total shares
Shareholding of second to tenth largest
shareholdersThe sum of the second to tenth largest shareholders’
shareholding percentage of total sharesZ index The shareholding of largest shareholder scaled by that of the
second largest shareholderRelation between ten largest shareholders 1 for existing relationship, 2 for no existing relationship, and 3
for uncertaintyInstitutional investor variablesShareholding of institutional investors The shareholding percentage of institutional investors.
Institutional investors include funds, brokers, brokerage
ﬁnancial products, QFII, insurance ﬁrms, social security funds,
annuity, trusts, and ﬁnancial ﬁrmsShareholding of funds The shareholding percentage of funds
External governance variables
Listed in B or H-share markets 1 for ﬁrms listed in the B or H-share markets and 0 otherwise
Audited by the Big 4 1 for ﬁrms audited by Big 4 ﬁrms and 0 otherwise
Audit feeDebt covenant variablesLeverage Total debt/total assetManagement shareholding variablesManagement shareholding The shareholding percentage of management. Management
includes the CEO, president, vice president, board secretary, and
other managers reported in the annual reportNature of ﬁrm variablesCentral SOE 1 for ﬁrms whose ultimate controlling shareholder is the central
government or its institutions and 0 otherwiseLocal SOE 1 for ﬁrms whose ultimate controlling shareholder is the local
government or its institutions and 0 otherwise
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